I Introduction
Free movement of workers across national boundaries is one of the four fundamental freedoms of EU law. 1 Although rules of public authorities preventing workers migrating between Member States were its original focus, in a series of decisions following the case of Walrave 2 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled that the freedom now equally applies to private parties engaged in the collective regulation of economic activities. 3 Similarly, CJEU jurisprudence following Bosman 4 has also developed free movement law beyond its original focus on practices that discriminated on the grounds of nationality to embrace a wider non-discriminatory 'prohibition on restrictions' or 'obstacles' test that prohibits any barriers to individuals moving across EU borders to pursue employment. 5 Measures directly impeding market access have to be justified even if they do not discriminate against foreign interests.
6 Therefore, any national laws or 'private' industry regulations or practices that seek to limit the ability of nationals from one Member State to work, or seek work, 7 in another Member State will potentially be incompatible with Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
However, for professional footballers, the freedom to move to an EU employer of their choice remains severely curtailed. Players midway through a contract with a club in one Member State who wish to move to a club in another will find a number of barriers in their way. First, s/he 8 will only be able to move clubs in less than four months of any given year. Second, s/he will only be able to move with the consent of the current employer, which is unlikely to be given without the desired new club paying a fee which may amount to tens of millions of Euros. If the player attempts to move without the consent of her/his existing employer, then s/he has only 15 days in the year to do this, the new club will need to pay an uncertain amount of compensation, and if the player is in the early stages of her/his contract, s/he will also serve a suspension from playing football. Younger players will have significantly less freedom than older players and will even be subject to some restrictions following the conclusion of their employment contract. 9 In economic terms, this means that elite players will be restricted to moving to a small number of clubs in a handful of EU states, which may exclude their nation of origin. This in turn may have an impact on competition law by reducing the ability of the vast majority of EU clubs to compete in the market for the best players.
Among the EU workforce, the restrictions on free movement for footballers 10 are mirrored only by similar restrictions in other professional sports, 11 but this situation is only part of the story. Of equal significance is the fact that the football 'transfer system' has been the focus of both the CJEU and the European Commission on several occasions, but despite a number of threats and rulings of incompatibility the restrictions persist and in some cases have actually reduced free movement since EU intervention. This article assesses the existing system against free movement and competition law provisions and explains how the Commission attempts to make it more compliant with EU law failed. Although the issue has been subject to previous academic debate, this paper seeks to show how the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) decisions post-2007 entrenched the restrictions, and to engage with new evidence from a 2012 European Commission-sponsored study into the impact of the transfer system. 12 Alongside the increasing CJEU focus on evidence-based proportionality tests, this casts further doubt on the justifiability of the payment of transfer fees under EU law.
II The International Football Transfer System
Despite dramatic commercial development, 13 professional football remains a game based on tradition. The ability of governing bodies such as FIFA (the world governing body) and UEFA (the European governing body) to run competitions derives not from any legal position outside of ad hoc contractual agreement but from a complex and ongoing political and economic exchange between the organisations, other stakeholders and public authorities. The vertical channel of authority running from FIFA has allowed football to adopt monopoly regulations and practices, 14 which are also rooted in tradition. While some have evolved to reflect commercial or technological developments, many remain better suited to the age they were drafted in, rather than the globalised and highly commercialised era in which the industry currently operates.
One such historic practice is the football transfer system, which governs how and when professional players (defined for Article 45 TFEU as workers) 15 can move between clubs (employers). The system developed from the English Football League's registration system of 1893 whereby, in order to secure the competition's integrity, only players registered with the league for a particular club could participate in matches. 16 This led to the practice of the payment of transfer fees as clubs in possession of a player's registration started to release it only on payment of compensation from the club wishing to employ them. 17 If the new club failed to meet the valuation, then the registration would remain with the current club and the player could not change employers. Technically, transfer fees were payable for the registration rather than the player, although in EU law terms this is an irrelevant distinction. transfer fee system greatly restricted the freedom of players to choose their employers; at its extremes, it prevented footballers from playing professional football completely. 18 The situation where an out-of-contract player's registration could be retained was finally abolished in the EU by FIFA following the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) decision in Bosman that this practice breached Article 45, 19 but the payment of transfer fees where the player was still under contract was not declared unlawful.
III EU Regulation of the Transfer System
The relationship between EU law and sport has been the subject of considered academic debate, 20 and it is not necessary to retread the more general issues in depth. It was applying the decision in Walrave, that EU law would only apply in sport to areas of 'economic activity' (as opposed to 'purely sporting' rules), that led the ECJ in Bosman to rule inter alia that transfer fees for out-of-contract players were unlawful. 21 Even though this ruling only affected 10% of active football players in Europe, 22 there was a considerable backlash from the football community 23 and subsequent lobbying from governing bodies concerned that EU law would strike down practices and traditions they believed inherent for the organisation of their sport. This led to the second phase of the relationship between EU law and sport, whereby EU institutions were encouraged to take into account the 'specificity' of sport in contrast to other industries. Requirements that EU institutions should recognise sport's specificity, and work with stakeholders to resolve clashes between sporting practices and the rigours of free movement and competition law, were drafted into Treaty Declarations 24 and the Helsinki Report. 25 Sport was to be seen as deserving of special treatment, although it remained unclear as to exactly how it should be treated as a special case in the EU. some form of transfer compensation system) is not. 27 He contends that '[p]rofessional football, in particular, has made much of the virtue of tradition, but in so far as it deploys its defence as a camouflage for the maintenance of inefficient or unfair practices in a world of increasing commercial exploitation of the sport's attractions, its subjection to EC trade law is entirely proper'. 28 This leads to a key point: sport is indeed a unique industry, but there is a difference between defending rules necessary for its operation, and protecting rules and practices that are simply traditional and potentially dated means of governing it. In this fraught and messy stage of the EU's relationship with sport, the current transfer system was contrived. Faced with losing players on a 'free transfer' (known as 'a Bosman') at the end of their contract, clubs encouraged players to sign longer contracts in order to retain the ability to claim a fee; 29 the subsequent increase in mid-contract transfers effectively circumvented Bosman.
30
This system does have certain benefits for players. While it does not provide contractual stability for a player wishing to remain at a club, it provides economic stability in terms of a compensation payment should they be transferred. Moreover, FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) decisions have indicated that players cannot be dismissed from their contracts for reasons of repeated or long-term injury, which under the employment law of many countries would be a potential reason for fair dismissal. However, this was not considered a fair trade off by FIFPro, the International Players Union, who contended that contracts should allow for unilateral termination by the player. 31 Contracts did not include notice periods, so while players could submit transfer requests if they wished to move, their freedom of movement ultimately depended upon the willingness of a new employer to match the selling club's valuation of them: unilateral termination of employment contracts by players did not result in the release of their registration. The media reported frequent instances of players wanting to move but being forced to continue to play for their current club, most notably Nicolas Anelka's desire to leave Arsenal to join Real Madrid; 32 EU free movement (in this case a French citizen's right to move from the UK to work in Spain) was clearly being restricted, with the best players limited to joining a handful of clubs in two or three Member States.
In 1998, the European Commission opened an infringement procedure against FIFA, following the CJEU's criticism of its reluctance to publicly enforce competition policy in football. 33 In this they had a natural ally in FIFPro, who they considered to be the primary beneficiaries of enhanced liberalisation of the player market. 34 The competition law concerns focused on whether the post-Bosman transfer system interfered with the market for the supply of players to clubs, particularly by limiting the ability of smaller clubs to enter into the market for elite players. 35 Commissioner Monti declared that the system was based on 'arbitrarily calculated fees that bear no relation to training costs' and should be prohibited, 36 and 'demanded restrictions of contract duration, unilateral right for contract termination and non-discretionary compensation payments for premature breach of contract'. 37 A compromise solution, rather than a finding of incompatibility, was supported by both the Nice Declaration and overt political pressure (including a press release from UK Prime Minister Blair and German Chancellor Schroeder), which argued that such fundamental reform of the transfer system would jeopardise the survival of smaller clubs relying on incoming fees. Although FIFPro were 'marginalised from the final stages of the negotiations', 38 a modification of the transfer system was finally agreed, with new regulations coming into force in September 2001. In June 2002, the Commission announced the formal closure of its investigations, 39 although it did not issue an exemption decision so there was no firm legal foundation for the agreement that consists only 'in an exchange of letters between the FIFA President and the Commissioner'.
40 As Weatherill suggests, there is 'little room for doubt that the background political mood played a role in encouraging the Commission to find a way to terminate its dogged pursuit of this matter'. 41 The Commission declared that the new rules 'find a balance between the players' fundamental right to free movement and stability of contracts together with the legitimate objective of the integrity of the sport and the stability of championships'. 42 This article contends that the development and current operation of the new system fail to achieve this balance.
Prima facie the new system abolished the payment of transfer fees. There was no reference to transfer fees in the new regulations, which instead looked to protect contractual stability by limiting player moves to two transfer 'windows' a season and a four-month suspension for players who breached their contracts during a 'protected period' in the first three years of the contract (two years for players over 28). Investment in training was incentivised by the payment of 'training compensation' for players under the age of 23 moving clubs (even out-of-contract). 43 The new regulations also stated that unilateral breach by a player, even outside the 'protected period', could lead to the payment of compensation to the club in line with contractual terms and/or national employment law. Clubs signing players in protected 34 ibid, 369. 35 periods could also receive sporting sanctions and transfer embargoes. 44 FIFPro's belief was that the new deal would provide free movement outside of the protected period upon payment of compensation only equalling the residual amount of wages on the contract. 45 However, after a brief reduction in the payment of transfer fees following the agreement, the amounts quickly rebounded. According to the 2013 Commission Report into the transfer system, fees increased from €403m in 1994/1995 to €1705m in 1999/2000. Immediately following the agreement, the number of transfers increased from 8531 to 15 952 in 2004/2005, but total expenditure only increased to €1952m, a dramatic drop in fees per transfer. However, by 2010/2011, although the number of transfers only marginally increased to 18 307, total fees paid that season rose sharply to €3002m. 46 This fall and subsequent rise in the growth of transfer fees correlates to the football industry's management of the post-2001 regulations (especially following the CAS decisions discussed below), although there is insufficient evidence to make a causal link. Nevertheless, the rebound in fees, coupled with the new transfer windows, sporting suspensions and training compensation, means that the Commissionendorsed system has arguably reduced the ability of players to exercise their right to free movement in the EU and further restricted the ability of clubs to enter into the market for elite players.
IV The Current System and the CAS
The current system is governed by FIFA's Status and Transfer of Players Regulations, which have been updated twice since the 2001 agreement but retain the key principles agreed with the Commission. Players wishing to unilaterally terminate their contract 'without just cause' can only do so within 15 days of the last competitive match of season, and will be subject to a sporting suspension (if they are still in the 'protected period') and the payment of compensation (even if outside this period). 'Sporting just cause' is defined in Article 15 of the regulations and includes not participating in more than 10% of matches that season. Players can also terminate for 'just cause' under Article 14, but other than a failure to pay the player the DRC has not acknowledged any player complaint to fall within this category. 47 The payment of transfer fees is still not explicitly mentioned in the regulations or FIFA's additional commentary. Disputes about whether 'just cause' exists and the level of compensation payable are determined by the DRC (an arbitration panel), with players agreeing to waive their rights under domestic employment law. 48 Appeals from the DRC are made to the CAS in Switzerland, which is run by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport. Following the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court that CAS satisfies the minimum standards for independent arbitration, 49 appeals can only be made under Swiss law on the grounds of procedural impropriety.
The 2001 agreement has not led to significant numbers of players unilaterally breaching their contracts. Most players still move between clubs following the established pre-2001 route-either they wait for the end of their contract and move on a free transfer, or, particularly at the elite end of the profession, following the payment of a transfer fee mid-contract. Such fee transfers can take place if players want to move and the club refuses to relinquish their registration, or when a club simply decides to 'sell' them. Clubs therefore retain the ability to unilaterally terminate a contract and receive a transfer fee, despite the fact that under most Member States' domestic employment laws, an employer's decision to terminate a contract should leave the employee as a free agent.
The fundamental reason why so few players are unilaterally breaking their contracts 'without just cause' and moving to the club of their choice is that there is no established method for determining the compensation payable. The fault here lies first with Article 17(1) of FIFA Regulations, which states that compensation should be calculated according to the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport, remuneration due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, time remaining on the existing contract, fees and expenses paid by the former club, whether the termination occurred during the protected period, and 'other relevant objective criteria'. The vagueness of the regulations is likely to discourage players from taking this route, and FIFPro has suggested that this was FIFA's intention in order to safeguard the pre-2001 system. 50 Certainty can of course be given to poorly drafted regulations with consistent interpretation and application at a judicial level, but CAS has thus far failed in this regard; it does not operate stare decisis and has made contradictory rulings on how compensation should be calculated. The extremes of CAS' jurisprudence on this are illustrated by the contrasting outcomes in Webster 51 and Matuzalem, 52 both of which were appeals against DRC decisions on quantum of compensation for unilateral breach.
In Webster, the player had one year remaining of his contract with Scottish club Hearts (out of the protected period) and refused to sign a new one. As a result of this intransigence, he was denied opportunities to play in first team matches and subsequently unilaterally terminated his contract without just cause. 53 The club claimed £4.9m in compensation (the estimated transfer value), but CAS awarded only £150 000, a sum reflecting the residual salary on his contract. 54 CAS did not take into account Scottish law or training investment, considered 'specificity of sport' too vague a concept, and rejected the idea that market value or wage at his new club was 49 relevant. 55 CAS' reasoning has received criticism, 56 but the decision briefly brought the system in line with that intended by the Commission, significantly increasing free movement, and arguably the ability of smaller clubs to compete for the best players (see below, Part V).
Webster can be contrasted to the subsequent Matuzalem decision where the player unilaterally breached his contract with Ukrainian club Donetsk (also outside the protected period but with two years remaining). CAS took into account the 'market value' of the player, which it calculated by reference to transfer payments (including the cost of a replacement) and future salary obligations of third parties. Adding up non-amortised transfer value and wages/bonuses of the new contract, this amounted to €7.3m annually. 57 It also added €600 000 before deducting the wages saved by Donetsk, making Matuzalem and his new employer jointly and severely liable for €11 858 934. 58 Had it followed the reasoning in Webster, it would have instead awarded €2.4m.
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The dramatic departure from Webster was not only in terms of quantum of damages but also overall tone and approach. CAS argued that the purpose of Article 17 was to underpin contractual stability not grant freedom of movement, claiming it 'does not give to a party, neither a club nor a player, a free pass to unilaterally breach an existing agreement at no price or at a given fix price'. 60 Furthermore, 'the purpose of art. 17 is basically nothing else than to reinforce contractual stability, ie to strengthen the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the world of international football, by acting as deterrent against unilateral contractual breaches. . .' 61 CAS made a fundamental error by interpreting Article 17 out of the political and legal context in which the changes to the transfer system were made; it expressly referred to the Nice Declaration White Paper on Sport and Lisbon Treaty 62 but selectively borrowed from EU law to support a decision that went against the spirit of the agreement leading to the regulations.
Matuzalem tries to make logical sense out of two diametrically opposed systems of regulating player movement, suggesting that in assessing a player's 'value', 'one shall take also in account what a club would-under normal circumstances-have to spend on the (transfer) market to contract the services like the ones of the Player'. 63 The panel went on to note, 'whether losing a mere chance to achieve a transfer can be 55 However, transfer market value is not included as a head of action in Article 17 because the regulations were supposed to replace the payment of transfer fees, not work alongside them. Herein lies the problem: the system allowing unilateral player breach as envisaged by the Commission's intervention cannot be made to logically work alongside the older system where transfer fees are still payable. To take into account 'market value' under the old system fatally undermines the new system which looked to abolish such payments. Attempting to crowbar transfer fee payments into the new regulations is impossible for precisely that reason. CAS, and arbitration clauses in football competition contracts more generally, has an important role to play in the regulatory space created by the specificity of sport. However, CAS' role in the development of the transfer system has ultimately hampered EU attempts to liberalise the player market and could raise wider concerns about the ability of existing sports arbitration to effectively work within this gap of autonomy granted to governing bodies.
V The Legality of the Transfer System under EU Law
There are clear problems in terms of consistency and certainty with the current system. The regulations, and their interpretation at arbitration, do not allow players to make informed decisions about the financial risk of unilaterally breaching contracts 'without just cause'. The risk of a high compensation payout means players prefer to rely on the traditional system of transfer fee payments, which continue to increase in value. This results in an arguably worse position than prior to the Commission intervention, with players having their free movement (under contract) restricted to a small number of clubs and Member States, and now also temporally within two transfer 'windows'. 69 The practical impact of the system clearly continues to restrict free movement of EU workers between Member States, potentially contrary to Article 45 TFEU. 64 ibid, para 117. 65 CAS 2009/A/1881. 66 In addition to a four-month playing suspension because the breach was in the protected period. 67 CAS 2010/A/2145-2147. 68 The extent to which CAS compensation awards can be enforced has been limited. A decision to ban Matuzalem from playing professional football until the award was paid was found to breach his rights under Additionally, the current system is also still challengeable under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In Balog v. Charleroi, 70 the pre-2001 system was challenged at the ECJ by a non-EU player, who had not benefited from the Bosman decision prohibiting post-contract payment of transfer fees. The Balog case was withdrawn on the day that AG Stix-Hackl's Opinion was due to be released, 71 but Stix-Hackl subsequently co-authored an article stating that both old and new systems breached competition law 72 and giving an indication of the unpublished Opinion. The authors argued that the post-2001 system is restrictive because clubs are not always free to engage players without a transfer payment and that the high value of this fee can prevent a player's transfer:
The clubs' access to their sources of supply is (. . .) restricted. The old as well as the new transfer system reduce the choice available to the clubs in respect of players who might be recruited by them. The old as well as the new rules with their uniform machinery thus replace the free play of the market forces of supply and demand on the acquisition market. 73 This has the effect of preventing smaller clubs from improving their sporting performance and consequently developing their economic activity, in turn strengthening the position of the economically dominant clubs. Although on-pitch success is clearly linked to player wages, 74 there is also an identifiable link between transfer spend and success, 75 and evidence that transfer fees could provide a bigger barrier to a club wishing to 'break in' to the elite than high wages alone. 76 The system is also likely to have the effect of artificially deflating wages for players. 77 Neither of these arguments are proven, but as Egger and Stix-Hackl highlight, the potential restrictive effect of either is sufficient to offend competition law.
No exemption can arise under competition law because 'transfer rules are not the result of negotiations between management and labour. . .nor do they have the effect of improving players' working conditions, which is what matters according to the case law'. 78 Weatherill also argues that the agreement is not brought within the sanctuary provided by the CJEU with regard to the exclusion from Article 101 for collective agreements in pursuit of improved employment conditions because the collective involvement was 'inconsistent and fragmented' and was not intended to improve employment conditions. 79 One potential defence for the system comes from the CJEU's decision in Wouters, 80 which allows the court to take into account the objectives of the governing bodies when introducing and maintaining the practices resulting in the restrictive effects. The objectives of improving the training and development of young players and enhancing competitive balance were considered legitimate by the court in Bosman.
81 However, in order for this to provide a defence, the governing bodies would need to be able to demonstrate 'whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them'. 82 In other words, FIFA and UEFA would need to demonstrate that the system led to an improvement in these areas and that the restrictions were proportionate to the gains achieved. 83 An abolition of transfer fees could of course have serious economic ramifications for clubs, for medium-term 'team building' and player investment decisions, and also by reducing the likelihood of external investment. However, these factors are trumped by the system's potential infringements of players' fundamental freedoms and are not sufficient to provide exemption under Article 101.
So is a new EU law challenge to the system likely? Although there have been numerous disputes settled in CAS, the last challenge in the CJEU to the system (rather than merely quantum of compensation) was in 2001. Furthermore, it appears that the Commission has little appetite for a further challenge to the legality of the system following the adverse publicity that surrounded the 1998-2001 dispute. The legal framework around how sport is treated within the EU has also been significantly modified since the agreement. First, the new CJEU authority for the limits of sporting autonomy for governing bodies is Meca-Medina, 84 which applied Wouters and stepped away from the previous 'sporting' v. 'economic' rules differentiation to hold that '. . .the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by the rule or the body which it has laid down'. 85 Potentially, this signposts a dramatic change in how the CJEU will approach sporting cases, making arguments (albeit ones that were unsuccessful in Bosman) that the transfer system is a sporting rather than an economic rule, and should therefore be beyond the reach of EU law, redundant. However, this does not mean that the CJEU is necessarily more likely to strike down integral and proportionate sporting rules; indeed, the contested anti-doping rules were upheld in Meca-Medina, which arguably grants more freedom for the court to consider sporting justifications.
Second, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon Article 6 established sport as a third tier supporting competence of the EU. Under Article 165(1) TFEU, the EU must take 'account of the specific nature of sport': Union action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen. 86 Given that the EU had no competence over sport in 2001, it might be thought that this provides additional protection to the transfer fee system. However, although 81 Bosman, n 4 supra, para 106. 82 88 and initial academic commentary, suggest that the impact will be limited. While on the one hand it could be argued that this indicates the CJEU has been neglecting the requirements of Article 165, Parrish argues that the court was already 'respectful of claims of sporting autonomy' and recognised the specificity of sport prior to the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, it is not yet established that Article 165 will horizontally affect other TFEU competences, including free movement and competition. 89 With regard to the sensitivity to which EU law is applied to sport, 'it is difficult to discern from the existing jurisprudence of the European Court and the decisional practice of the Commission, a pattern of insensitive application of EU law to sport'. 90 In a similar vein, Weatherill argues, 'Sports federations are wearyingly eager to pillory the institutions of the EU. . .for their alleged failure to take adequate account of sport's special characteristics, but in fact Bernard, like Bosman before it, is remarkably generous to sport'. 91 Initial signs are that the Lisbon Treaty will confirm CJEU jurisprudence on the application of the Treaty provisions to the payment of transfer fees, but it is possible that the express emphasis on 'fairness and openness' in Article 165 could be used to attack the current system, particularly with regard to the ability of smaller clubs to compete in the market for the elite players.
As we have seen, the EU's treatment of the transfer system already indicated that it viewed football as 'special'. Most notably in Bosman, the ECJ was of the opinion that '[i]n view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between the clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate'. 92 Protecting integrity of competition, 'competitive balance' and 'training and development' of young players have been the main pillars against which sport's governing bodies have looked to support regulations, practices and traditions that are prima facie breaches of EU law. 93 It has been argued that the transfer system achieves the first by preventing players from moving between clubs and distorting competition late in football seasons. For the second, it is claimed that the system redistributes money from commercially more developed clubs and leagues to smaller ones through the payment of fees, resulting in more meaningful competition. The system aims to achieve the third aim by incentivising investment in the development of young players, with training clubs knowing they will be compensated when players change clubs.
These aims have been accepted in both CJEU cases and European Commission statements as legitimate both pre-and post-Lisbon. 94 The problem is whether there is any evidence that the payment of transfer fees (or the more circuitous payment of equivalent amounts of compensation via the arbitration route) achieves any of these aims. In terms of non-discriminatory barriers to free movement, Gebhard is the key CJEU authority, stating that such obstacles 'must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it'. 95 If, following Bosman, we proceed on the basis that (1) the transfer system is applied in a non-discriminatory manner and (2) has objective justifications 96 in the public interest (ie incentivising the development of young players and maintaining competitive balance), then the legality of the transfer system would rest on an application of the proportionality test. It is most common to see this as a two-part test, with the imposer of the restriction needing to demonstrate both the suitability (a 'means and ends' test) and the necessity (a 'balancing competing interests' test) of the measure. 97 This latter test includes the requirement that the measures pursued do not go beyond what is necessary-ie that no least restrictive alternatives exist that could achieve the same aims. It has been argued that in sport, applying the proportionality test overlaps with lex sportiva and the specificity of sport, 98 acting as both a 'legal buffer' and helping to guarantee governing bodies 'relative autonomy'. 99 However, even read in conjunction with Article 165, we should not assume that this means that the CJEU would accept the transfer system as a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.
The CJEU has not always applied a consistent version of the proportionality test, and measures have been subjected to different levels of judicial scrutiny. 100 However, the Court appears to enforce a more rigorous standard when assessing national (or private) measures to community ones, 101 and with specific reference to sport it has been argued that the application of the test in Bosman was in fact very strict. 102 More generally, academic commentary on the approach of the CJEU to the proportionality principle suggests that while the court may be increasingly open to recognising and accepting imperative requirements, this recognition 'is matched by closer scrutiny of those justifications and/or the strict application of the proportionality principle and rhetoric of the authorities and the system's actual impact is starker, and casts further doubt on whether the current system could survive a challenge. 113 The 2013 report found that '[o]verall solidarity compensation (ie training compensation and solidarity mechanism) 114 directly linked to transfers only accounts for 1.84% of total agreed transfer fees in Europe'. 115 In short, there was little evidence that the payment of transfer fees was incentivising investment in training or development except in situations where the training club directly received a significant transfer fee. 116 As to the question of whether the system improved or maintained competitive balance, the findings were even bleaker: the report found that the Champions League was increasingly having the characteristics of a 'closed league' with the same teams qualifying each season. These teams were the beneficiaries of the transfer system which reinforced their dominance of sporting competition at both the European and domestic level.
117 'The evolution of the transfer market has contributed to undermining the fairness of competition', concludes the report. 118 In other words, the transfer system was having the opposite effect to that which FIFA and UEFA had relied on as a justification for the system's prima facie infringements of EU law. Competitive balance, the report suggests, would be improved if the system was abolished. Youth development could be incentivised further by least restrictive alternatives such as financial incentives to produce talented players, meaning that even if the system were found to be suitable to achieve its legitimate aims, it is not necessary and is therefore disproportionate. In terms of maintaining sporting integrity, which is not discussed in detail in the report, it is transfer windows that perform this task, not the payment of transfer fees. Unless the 2013 Commission-sponsored report is robustly challenged by independent peer-reviewed evidence and analysis, it would most likely be viewed by the CJEU as the authoritative study into the workings of the transfer system should a challenge arise.
The new evidence also makes a potential challenge under competition law more likely to succeed; the current system continues to artificially restrict the market for players to those clubs that could afford to pay high transfer fees, thereby limiting the ability of smaller clubs to compete at the top level. Because the 2013 report suggests a serious failure of the transfer system to enhance competitive balance, and-at best-a marginal incentive to invest in the training and development of young players, further doubt is cast on the ability of the system to be saved from a challenge under the Wouters criteria; the objectives of the system are simply not achieved by its operation.
Neither the long-standing problems under free movement or competition law are sufficiently mitigated by the post-2001 reforms. Had the new system progressed as the Commission intended (and occurred in Webster), then transfer fees would not have had the effect of restraining free movement or restricting competition. However, more recent CAS decisions, in particular Matuzalem, demonstrate that at best a 113 Although it also noted there were relatively few disputes about transfer fees. 114 UEFA solidarity payments are paid to support domestic association infrastructure and clubs eliminated from UEFA competitions at qualification stage. The amount is tiny in comparison to that available for successful clubs, and the report found that most solidarity payments went to clubs in the five commercially dominant leagues. 115 player unilaterally breaching his/her contract is unclear as to his/her potential financial liability, and at worst can expect a compensation fee to be set at the market value of the transfer fee (under the old system) paid to bring in a replacement. The attempt to combine the new system of compensation for unilateral breach with the old system of arbitrary transfer payments has made the former redundant; the current regime is essentially a complete triumph for the football authorities rather than a genuine compromise.
Recent CJEU jurisprudence points to an increased rigour with which the court tests justifications, and an increasing reliance on precise evidence. Combined with the longer term shift following Walrave with which the court is willing to accept free movement claims from a wider range of applicants (affected not just by discriminatory obstacles and against private bodies as well as national states), this means that recent evidence pertaining to the transfer system's failings strikes a potentially fatal blow to the survival of the payment of transfer fees in the EU. This is not to dismiss the uncertainty that remains following decisions like Deliege 119 about the CJEU's treatment of the specificity of sport nor the desire of the Court to allow governing bodies to retain regulatory independence. 120 However, on balance, even with the introduction of Article 165 TFEU, the sympathy granted to sports regulators by the Commission is unlikely to be reflected by the CJEU should a challenge be made to the transfer system.
VI Conclusions
It is now widely acknowledged that the Commission's attempt to limit the payment of excessive transfer fees, and their subsequent impact on free movement and competition within the EU, failed. 121 The vagueness of the FIFA Regulations on determining compensation for unilateral breach has been compounded by CAS' interpretation of these rules, which have fundamentally undermined the spirit of the 2001 agreement. While the Commission believed that the new regulations struck the right balance between enhancing free movement of footballers and protecting sporting competition, in all bar the Webster case CAS has instead viewed them as being purely about protecting contractual stability. By tying compensation payments to the value of purchasing a replacement player using the traditional method of transfer fee payments, transfer fees have been reintroduced into situations of unilateral breach in a way that was not envisioned by the Commission. The contrast between CAS' approach and that of the CJEU in Bernard in ensuring the linkage between training costs and compensation could not be starker, 122 and the role that CAS has played in defending the traditional and legally problematic transfer system should not be underestimated. In light of their later jurisprudence, transfer fees have rebounded, peaking in the reported £85m paid by Real Madrid for Gareth Bale in 2013 and the record €2340m spent by the 'big five' European leagues in the 2014 summer transfer window. 123 Despite this, there appears no appetite on the part of the Commission to relaunch infringement procedures. Indeed, despite the evidence about the failure of the system to achieve its legitimate aims, the 2013 Commission-sponsored report concluded: 'The findings do not argue for an end of transfer rules as implemented by sports governing bodies', 124 instead recommending a slight increase in solidarity payments. This conclusion does not stand up to scrutiny and appears to be the result of an inadequate application of the relevant EU law to the economic analysis. The findings suggest that the payment of transfer fees has had an adverse effect on competitive balance and very little positive impact upon investment in youth development. Therefore, so long as fees can prevent players from moving between Member States, or prevent smaller clubs from competing against the larger ones, their use is a disproportionate breach of EU law. Some system of player registration and transfer obviously needs to remain to ensure that competitions function fairly, but the payment of fees above and beyond genuine compensation for training costs as set out in Bernard can no longer be justified. The report's conclusion does, however, enable the Commission to avoid reopening its investigation into the transfer system, which previously caused it so much political damage.
This fits with the Commission's increasingly 'hands off' approach to how governing bodies organise their sports. From Bosman onwards, and particularly following Meca-Medina, 125 the CJEU has granted a zone of autonomy to governing bodies to arrange their sports, and with the introduction of Article 165 it is doubtful that this zone will be encroached on in the future by high-profile action by the Commission. The problems with the system have not changed since the 1998 challenge, but the sports policy of the EU has shifted enough to make another intervention highly unlikely. Future action by the Commission is also made less likely due to the increasing emphasis on social dialogue in labour disputes between FIFPro and the associations of professional leagues and clubs. 126 Specificity of sport seems here to stay, and few argue that sport should be subjected to the full rigours of EU law given its unique structure in terms of competitive balance, and its social benefits for EU citizens and the European project more generally. However, it is also difficult to defend a position whereby specificity is allowed to draw a veil over practices that limit the fundamental freedoms of workers without genuine and provable beneficial effects.
That said, the FIFA/Commission agreement is not legally binding. 127 Should players consider that the price of a transfer fee (or the threat of an equivalent compensation payout) was limiting their right to free movement between Member States (or, less likely, a club that believed their ability to compete with dominant rivals was being diminished), they would still be able to bring an action in a national court that would most likely be referred to the CJEU. If this occurred, it is contended that the existing system would not stand up to scrutiny under either Article 45 or Articles 101/102 TFEU, particularly in light of the evidence from the 2013 report. Following the 2001 Commission agreement, FIFPro appeared unwilling to fund litigation, and there was a lack of individual litigants willing to take legal action and risk damaging their career, but this situation may change. In December 2013, FIFPro declared that 'the transfer system fails 99% of players around the world' and announced that it would be challenging the system, 'preparing all necessary means, including legal action, to reinstall the world's professional football players' rights as workers'. 128 The statement focused on the failures of the current system, particularly with regard to competitive balance, and cited the 2013 report. The announcement could force the Commission's hand and lead to a relaunch of the infringement procedure, or alternatively FIFPro may find a litigant to challenge the system in the CJEU. More likely is another negotiated settlement, albeit this time one that pushes free movement of footballers, and the ability of the commercially weaker clubs to compete with more successful teams, beyond the current position and closer to the free market principles underpinning EU law. 
